It is well-known that the linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) can be constructed from linear error-correcting codes (Brickell [1], R.J. McEliece and D.V.Sarwate [2],Cramer, el., [3] ). The theory of linear codes from algebraic-geometric curves (algebraic-geometric (AG) codes or geometric Goppa code) has been well-developed since the work of V.Goppa and Tsfasman, Vladut, and Zink( see [17] , [18] and [19]). In this paper the linear secret-sharing scheme from algebraicgeometric codes, which are non-threshold schemes for curves of genus greater than 0, are presented . We analysis the minimal access structure, d min and d cheat ([8]), (strongly) multiplicativity and the applications in verifiable secret-sharing (VSS) scheme and secure multi-party computation (MPC) of this construction ([3] and [10] [11] ). Our construction also offers many examples of the self-dually GF (q)-representable matroids and many examples of new ideal linear secret-sharing schemes addressing to the problem of the characterization of the access structures for ideal secret-sharing schemes ([3] and [9]). The access structures of the linear secret-sharing schemes from the codes on elliptic curves are given explicitly. From the work in this paper we can see that the algebraic-geometric structure of the underlying algebraic curves is an important resource for secret-sharing, matroid theory, verifiable secret-sharing and secure multi-party computation.
I. Introduction and Preliminaries
In a secret-sharing scheme among the set of participants P = {P 1 , ..., P n }, a dealer P 0 , not in P, has a secret, the dealer distributes the secret among P, that is gives each participant a share of secret, in such a way that only the qualified subsets of P can reconstruct the secret from their shares. The access structure , Γ ⊂ 2 P , of a secret-sharing scheme is the defined to be the family of the qualified subsets of P. The minimum accesss structure minΓ ⊂ 2 P is defined to the be the set of minimum elements in Γ(here we use the natural order relation S 1 < S 2 if and only if S 1 ⊂ S 2 on 2 P ). The family of all subsets of P which are not qualified is called the adversary structure( see [3] and 10]). We call a secret-sharing scheme a (k, n)-threshold scheme if the access structure consists of the subset of at least k elements in the set P, where the number of elements in the set P is exactly n, that is, among the n members any subset of k or more than k members can reconstruct the secret. The first secrets-sharing scheme was given independently by Blakley [4] and Shamir [5] in 1979, actually they gave threshold secret-sharing scheme. We call a secret-sharing scheme perfect if the the unqualified subsets of members to reconstruct the secret have no information of the secret. The existence of secret-sharing schemes with arbitrary given access structures was proved in [6] and [7] .
For a secret-sharing scheme, let V be the set of all possible shares (v 1 , ..., v n ) (Here v i is the share of the participant P i for i = 1, ..., n). Then V is a error-correcting code(not necessarily linear), let d min be the minimum Hamming distance of this error-correcting code V. From the error-correcting capability, it is clear that the cheaters can be identified from any share(presented by the participants)(v 1 , ..., v n ) if there are at most [(d min − 1]/2] cheaters. In [2] McEliece and Sarwate proved that d min = n − k + 1 for Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme. K.Okada and K.Kurosawa introduced anther parameter d cheat for general secret-sharing scheme, as the the number such that the correct secret value s can be recovered if there are at most [(d cheat − 1)/2] cheaters ( [8] ). It is clear d min ≤ d cheat , it is proved in [8] that d cheat = n − max B∈(2 P −Γ )|B|, where |B| is the number of the elements in the set B.
Let K be a finite field. A K-linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) on the set of participants P = {P 1 , ..., P n } is defined as a sequences of surjective linear mappings {T 0 , T 1 , ..., T n }, where T i : E −→ E i , E and E i are finite dimensional spaces over K(E 0 = K). For any x ∈ E, {T 1 (x), ..., T n (x)} are the shares of of the secret value k = T 0 (x). The complexity of the K-LSSS is defined as λ(Γ) = Σ n i=1 dim K (E i ), when the complexity is n, this LSSS is called ideal. One of the main open problem in secrete sharing is the characterization of the access structures of ideal secret sharing schemes (see [3] and [9] ).
For an access structure Γ, λ K (Γ) is defined to be the minimum of all the values Σ n i=1 dim K (E i ) for K-linear secret sharing schemes with access structure Γ(see [12] [13] ).A LSSS is called multiplicative, K-MLSSS if every participant i ∈ P can compute, form his shares k i , k ′ i of two shared secrets k, k ′ ∈ K, a value c i ∈ K such that the product kk ′ is a linear combination of all the values c 1 , ..., c n . It is called strongly multiplicative if for any subset A such that P − A is not qualified, the product kk ′ can be computed using only values from the participants in A. µ K (Γ) is defined to be the minimum of all the values of Σ n i=1 dim K (E i ) for multiplicative K-linear secret sharing schemes with access structure Γ. For an access structure Γ on P, it is said that Γ is Q 2 if A B = P for any A, B ∈ Γ, Γ is Q 3 if A B C = P for any A, B, C ∈ Γ. One of the key result in [10] is a method to construct, from any LSSS with Q 2 access structure Γ, a multiplicative LSSS with the same access structure and double complexity, that is µ(Γ) ≤ 2λ(Γ). K-MLSSS and Q 2 ,Q 3 access structure are closely related to secure multiparty computations (see [3] , [10] and [11] ).
The approach of secret-sharing based on error-correcting codes was studied in [1] , [2] , [3] , [12] [13] [14] [15] . It is found that actually Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme is just the secret-sharing scheme based on the famous Reed-Solomon (RS) code. The error-correcting code based secret-sharing scheme is defined as follow. Here we suppose C is a error-correcting codes over the finite field GF (q) (where q is a prime power) with code length n + 1 and dimension k, i.e., C is a k dimension subspace of GF (q) n+1 The Hamming distance d(C) of this error-correcting code C is defined as follows.
,where wt(v) is called the Hamming weight of v. Let G = (g ij ) 1≤i≤k,0≤j≤n be the generator matrix of C, i.e., G is a k × (n + 1) matrix in which k rows of G is a base of the k dimension subspace C of GF (q) n+1 . Suppose s is a given secret value of the dealer P 0 and the secret is shared among P = {P 1 , ..., P n }, the set of n participants . Let g 1 = (g 11 , ..., g k1 ) T be the 1st column of G. Chosen a random u = (u 1 , ..., u k ) ∈ GF (q) k such that s = u τ g 0 = Σu i g i0 . The codeword c = (c 0 , ..., c N ) = uG, it is clear that c 0 = s is the secret, then the dealer P 0 gives the i − th participant P i the c i as the share of P i for i = 1, ..., n. In this secret-sharing scheme the error-correcting code C is assumed to be known to every participant and the dealer. For a secret sharing scheme form error-correcting codes, suppose that T i : GF (q) k −→ GF (q) is defined as T i (x) = x τ g i , where i = 0, ..., n and g i is the i-th column of the generator matrix of the code C. In this form we see that the secret sharing scheme is an ideal GF (q)-LSSS.
We refer the following Lemma to [12] [13] [14] [15] .
Lemma 1 (see [12] [13] [14] [15] ). Suppose the dual of C, C ⊥ = {v = (v 0 , .., v n ) : Gv = 0} has no codeword of Hamming weight 1. In the above secret-sharing scheme based on the error-correcting code C, (P i 1 , ..., P im ) can reconstruct the secret if and only if there is a codeword v = (1, 0, ..., v i 1 , ..., v im , ...0) in C ⊥ such that v i j = 0 for at least one j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
The secret reconstruction is as follows, since Gv = 0,
For the definition of matroid and the matroid on the set P = {P 1 , ..., P n } from a linear [n, k, d] code, we refer to [16] , it is well-known that the circuits (minimal dependent set) on the matroid from a linear code is in one-to-one correspondence of the codewords with minimum Hamming weight d. Thus a subset A of P = {P 1 , ..., P n } is a minimal qualified subset of the LSSS from linear code C if and only if {0} A is a circuit in the matroid from C (see [3] ).
We need recall some basic facts about algebraic-geometric codes( see [17] , [18] and [19] ). Let X be an absolutely irreducible, projective and smooth curve defined over GF (q) with genus g, D = {P 0 , ...P n } be a set of GF (q)-rational points of X and G be a GF (q)-rational divisor satisfy-
is the linear space (over GF (q)) of all rational functions with its divisor not smaller than −G and Ω(B) = {ω : (ω) ≥ B} be the linear space of all differentials with their divisors not smaller than B. Then the functional
over GF (q). We know that the functional code is just the evaluations of functions in L(G) at the set D and the residual code is just the residues of differentials in Ω(G−D) at the set D (see [17] [18] [19] ).
We also know that C L (D, G) and C Ω (D, G) are dual codes. It is known that for a differential η that has poles at P 1 , ...P n with residue 1 (there always exists such a η, see [18] ) we have
, the function f corresponds to the differential f η. This means that functional codes and residue code are essentially the same. It is clear that if there exist a differential η such that
) is a self-dual code over GF (q), in many cases the matroids from AG-codes can be computed explicitly from the algebraic-geometric structure of the underlying curves, thus we have many interesting examples of self-dually GF (q)-representable matroids (see section VI below)from this construction. For many examples of AG codes, including these self-dual AG-codes, we refer to [17] , [18] and [19] .
II Main Results
Let X be an absolutely irreducible, projective and smooth curve defined over GF (q) with genus g, D = {P 0 , ...P n } be a set of GF (q)-rational points of X and G be a GF (q)-rational divisor with degree m satisfying supp(G) D =, 2g − 2 < m < n + 1. We can have a LSSS on the n participants P = {P 1 , ..., P n } from the linear code C Ω (D, G), thus we know that the reconstruction of the secret is based from its dual code C L (D, G). For the curve with genus 0 over GF (q), we have exactly the same LSSS as Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme, since the AG-codes over the curve of genus 0 is just the RS codes (see [17] [18] [19] ).
The following are the main results of this paper. Theorem 1. The LSSS over GF (q) from the code C Ω (D, G) has the following properties. 1) This LSSS is ideal; 2) Any subset A ⊆ P satisfying |A| < n − m is not qualified subset, any subset A ⊆ P satisfying |A| ≥ n − m + 2g is qualified. Proposition 1. Let X, D, P and G as above. Suppose the genus g of X is not 0, n > 3 and the minimum (
is not a threshold secret-sharing scheme. Let X, D, P and G as above, A is the adversary structure of the LSSS from the residue code C Ω (D, G). Then we have the following result (for the definitions in the following result we refer to [10] and [11] ). Theorem 3. For the finite field GF (q) and the adversary structure A as above. 1) If m ≥ 2n 3 + 2g, then there exists a polynomial complexity error-free VSS (Verifiable SecretSharing , over GF (q))protocol in the information-theoretic scenario, secure against any active and adaptive A-adversary. 2) If m ≥ 2n 3 + 2g, for any arithmetic circuit U over GF (q), then there exists a polynomial complexity error-free MPC (Multi-party Computation)protocol computing U in the information-theoretic scenario, secure against any adaptive and active A-adversary. 3) If m ≥ n 2 + 2g, for any arithmetic circuit U over GF (q), then there exists a polynomial complexity error-free MPC (Multi-party Computation)protocol computing U in the information-theoretic scenario, secure against any adaptive and passive A-adversary.
Proposition 2. For the LSSS over GF
Proof of Theorem 1. 1) is clear from the construction. If A is a qualified subset of P, then there exists a codeword in C L (D, G) such that this codeword is not zero at P 0 and some P i 's in the subset A, and this codeword is zero at P − A (Lemma 1
Riemann-Roch theorem (see [17] [18] [19] [20] ), where A c = P − A. We also know that the linear system (see [20] ) defined by the divisor G − A c has no base point since deg(G − A c ) ≥ 2g (see [20] ). Thus we have one function f ∈ L(G − A c ) such that f is not zero at P 0 and zero at all points in the set A c , so the codeword in C L (D, G) corresponding to this f is not zero at P 0 and not zero at a subset A (or A itself). So A is qualified.
Proof of Proposition 1. If the LSSS from
This imply that any subset A of P with cardinality |A| = m is linearly equivalent (A is considered as a divisor, see [20] for the definition of linear equivalence), since n > 3 and n−m > 1, we know that any two points in P are linear equivalent, so dim(L(P i )) ≥ 2 for any point
where K is a canonical divisor of the curve X. If g = 1, this is obviously not true since K = 0 in this case. If g ≥ 2, it is known that the canonical linear system has no base point. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. It is clear d min is the minimum distance of the code C L (P, G), so d min ≥ n−m. On the other hand the minimum Hamming weight of C Ω (D, G) is at least m−2g+2, thus max B∈2 P −Γ |B| ≤ m − 2g. Thus d cheat = n − max B∈2 P −Γ |B| ≤ n − m + 2g. The conclusion is proved.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose to secret are distributed, we know that the shares of the participant P i are just the function values
Thus there is a non-zero codeword in C Ω (D, 2(D − G + (η))). On the other hand if the linear system corresponding to Ω(2(D − G + (η))) (corresponding to L(2G − D − (η))) has no base point( it is valid if deg(2G − D − (η)) ≥ 2g, see [20] ), we can make this codeword in C Ω (D, 2(D − G + (η))) not zero at the position P 0 . Thus f 1 (P 0 )f 2 (P 0 ) is a linear combination of the f 1 (P 1 )f 2 (P 1 ), ..., f 1 (P n )f 2 (P n ). The conclusion of 1) is proved. For the conclusion 2), we only need to prove that the linear system corresponding to L(2G − D − (η) − H) has no base point for any H a unqualified subset of P. From Theorem 1 deg(H) < n − m + 2g. Thus the conclusion of 2) is true if deg(2G − D − (η) − H) ≥ 2g. The conclusion of 2) is proved.
Proof of Theorem 3. From Theorem 1 we know that each subset H of P in the adversary structure has at most n − m + 2g − 1 elements. The adversary structure is Q 2 if m ≥ We should note that the parameters m can be chosen quite flexibly as in the theory of AGcodes( see [17] [18] [19] ).
III An Asymptotic Result.
For any given finite field GF (q 2 ) where q is a prime power, it is known there exists a family of smooth projective curves {X t } (t=1,2,...) defined over GF (q 2 ) with N ′ t rational points(over GF (q 2 )) and genus g t such that lim N ′ t gt = q − 1 (see f.g. [21] ), the family of curves over GF (q 2 ) attaining the Drinfeld-Vladut bound (see [18] [19] ). This family of curves is important for the existence of the family of AG-codes exceeding the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. By choosing m suitably we can have a similar asymptotic result for the LSSS from AG-codes. Corollary 1. For any given finite field GF (q 2 ) with q 2 (q ≥ 11 ) elements, there exists a family of natural numbers {N t } (t=1,2,...) such that {N t } (t=1,2,...) go to infinity, a family of access structures {Γ t } on the set of N t elements with the property that any subset less than k 1 t elements is not in Γ t and any subset more than k 2 t elements is in Γ t . We can construct 1) ideal GF (q 2 )-LSSS with the access structure Γ t ; 2) VSS over GF (q 2 ) secure against any adaptive and active Γ c t -adversary structures (Γ c t consisting of subsets not in Γ t ); 3) MPC (computing any arithmetic circuit over GF (q 2 )) secure against any adaptive and active Γ c t -adversary. Moreover the parameters (k 1 t , k 2 t , N t ) can be chosen satisfying lim
This result follows from the main result in [21] and Theorem 1,2,3 above directly.
IV LSSS from Elliptic Curves
We need to recall the following result in [22] [23] .
Theorem 4(see [22] ). 1) Let E be an elliptic curve over GF (q) with the group of GF (q)-rational points E(GF (q)). Then E(GF (q)) is isomorphic to Z n 1 Z n 2 , where n 1 is a divisor of q − 1 and n 2 2) If E is supersingular, then E(GF (q)) is either
In this section and the section VI we analysis the access structure of the LSSS from the elliptic curves and the self-dually GF (q)-representable matroid from the AG-codes on elliptic curves.
For any given elliptic curve E over GF (q), from the above Theorem let D ′ = {0, g 1 , ...g H−1 } be a subgroup of E(GF (q)) which is of order H(Here 0 us the zero element of the group). 0, g 1 , ..., g H−1 correspond to the rational points O, P 1 , P 2 , ..., P H−1 of E. In the construction of section II, we take G = mO, D = {P 1 , ..., P H−1 } and P = {P 2 , ..., P H−1 }. We have the following result. Proof. We know that for any t points W 1 , ..., W t in E(GF (q)) the divisor W 1 + ... + W t − tO is linear equivalent to the divisor W − O, where W is the group sum of W 1 , ..., W t in the group E(GF (q)). From the proof of Theorem 1, {P i 1 , ..., P im } c is a qualified subset (therefor minimal qualified subset) if there exist a function f ∈ L(G) such that f (P i 1 ) = ... = f (P im ) = 0, this means that the divisor P i 1 + ... + P im is linearly equivalent to G = mO. The conclusion of 1) is proved.
From the proof of Theorem 1, {P i 1 , ..., P i m−1 } c is a qualified subset if there exist a function f ∈ L(G) such that f (P i 1 ) = ... = f (P i m−1 ) = 0, this means that the divisor P i 1 + ... + P i m−1 + B is linearly equivalent to G = mO for some effective divisor B. It is clear that deg(B) = 1 and B is a GF (q)-rational point in E. From the group structure of E(GF (q)), B is in D ′ . On the other hand we note that B = P 0 , so B is O or a point in P. The conclusion of 1) is proved. The conclusion of 3) follows from Theorem 1 directly. Example 1. Let E be the elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 +5x+4 defined over GF (7) . Then E(GF (7)) is a cyclic group of order 10 with O the point at infinity and P 0 = (3, 2), P 1 = (2, 6), P 2 = (4, 2), P 3 = (0, 5) P 4 = (5, 0), P 5 = (0, 2), P 6 = (4, 5), P 7 = (2, 1), P 8 = (3, 5) . From an easy computation we know that P 0 is a generator of E(GF (7)) and P i is (i + 1)P 0 (in the group operation of E(GF (7)).) We take G = 3O, D = {P 0 , P 1 , ..., P 8 }, then the access structure of the ideal GF (7)-LSSS from C Ω (D, G) are the following subsets of P = {P 1 , ..., P 8 }. 1) All subsets of P with 7 elements and the set P;
2) The following 10 subsets of 6 elements {P 1 , P 3 } c {P 1 , P 5 } c ,{P 1 , P 7 } c ,{P 1 , P 8 } c {P 2 , P 3 } c ,{P 2 , P 6 } c , {P 3 , P 5 } c ,{P 3 , P 7 } c ,{P 5 , P 6 } c ,{P 5 , P 7 } c are the minimal qualified subset;
3) The following 5 subsets with 5 elements {P 1 , P 2 , P 4 } c ,{P 2 , P 7 , P 8 } c ,{P 3 , P 6 , P 8 } c , {P 4 , P 5 , P 8 } c , {P 4 , P 6 , P 7 } c are the minimal qualified subset. Example 2. Let E be the elliptic curve y 2 + y = x 3 defined over GF (4). This is the Hermitian curve over GF (4), it has 9 rational points and E(GF (4)) is isomorphic to Z 3 Z 3 . We take G = 3O, where O is the zero element in the group E(GF (4)). Let P ij be the rational point on E corresponding to (i, j) in Z 3 Z 3 . D = {P 10 , P 01 , ..., P 22 }, P = {P 01 , ..., P 22 }. Then the qualified subsets of the ideal LSSS from C Ω (D, G) are as follows. 1) The minimal qualified subsets of 4 elements are {P 20 , P 21 , P 02 } c ,{P 01 , P 20 , P 22 } c ,{P 11 , P 12 , P 20 } c .
2) The minimal qualified subsets of 5 elements are {P 01 , P 02 } c ,{P 11 , P 22 } c ,{P 12 , P 21 } c .
3) The subsets of P of 6 elements and the set P are qualified.
V LSSS from Klein Quartic
Klein quartic is the genus 3 curve x 3 y + y 3 z + z 3 x = 0 ( in the projective plane) defined over GF (8) . It is well-known there are 24 rational points (over GF (8), see [23] ).It is clear that Q 1 = (1 : 0 : 0), Q 2 = (0 : 1 : 0), Q 3 = (0 : 0 : 1) are 3 rational points on X. The line L 0 : y = 0 intersects X at 3Q 1 + Q 3 (count with multiplicity, see [20] ). The line L α i : y = α i x, where α 1 , ..., α 7 are 7 non-zero elements of GF (8), intersects X at Q 3 and other 3 rational points. Set P be the set of these 21 rational points, G = 3Q 1 + Q 3 and D = {Q 2 } P. We consider the LSSS from the residue code C Ω (D, G).
In this case though deg(G)
are dual codes(see [19] ).
It should be noted that the line passing through any two distinct points in P have to pass the other 2 points in the set P(see [23] ).
Proposition 3. The minimal qualified subset of the LSSS from C Ω (D, G) are the subsets of P of the form {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } c , where P 1 , P 2 , P 3 and Q 3 are on the line L α i for some i ∈ {1, , ..., 7}, or {P ′ 1 , P ′ 2 , P ′ 3 , P ′ 4 } c for some 4 points in P which are on one line.
Proof. From Riemann-Roch Theorem dim(L(G)) = 3, so {x, y, z} are the base. So every function in L(G) is of the form ax+by+cz y
. The subset A c of P is qualified if and only if there exists one f ∈ L(G) such that f is zero on A, the conclusion follows directly.
VI Self Dually GF (q) Representable Matroids from AG-codes
For X, D, G as in section 2, if there exist a differential η on X such that D − G + (η) = G then the matroid from the code C L (D, G) is self-dully GF (q)-representable. In many cases from algebraic geometry the matroid of the corresponding AG-codes C Ω (D, G) = C L (D, G) can be calculated. This offers many examples of new self-dually representable matroids (see [3] for the background).
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over GF (q), it is known that the canonical divisor of E is zero, so the condition that there exists a differential η such that D − G + (η) = G is equivalent to the condition that D − G and G are linear equivalent.
Let D = {g 1 , ...g H } be a subset of non-zero elements in E(GF (q)), where H is even and the group sum of all elements in D is zero in E(GF (q)). g 1 , ..., g H correspond to the rational points P 1 , ..., P H of E. In the construction, we take G = mO, where m = 
The proof of Theorem 6 is similar to that of Theorem 5.
Example 3. Let E be the elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + 5x + 4 defined over GF (7) . Then E(GF (7)) is a cyclic group of order 10 with O the point at infinity and P 0 = (3, 2), P 1 = (2, 6), P 2 = (4, 2), P 3 = (0, 5) P 4 = (5, 0), P 5 = (0, 2), P 6 = (4, 5), P 7 = (2, 1), P 8 = (3, 5).Set D = {P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 5 , P 6 , P 7 , P 8 }, G = 4O. It is clear the group sum of all points in D is zero. Then the circuits of the self-dually GF (7) representable matroid defined by
are the following subsets of D.
1) The following 8 subsets of 4 elements {P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , P 4 } c , {P 0 , P 1 , P 7 , P 8 } c , {P 0 , P 2 , P 6 , P 8 } c , {P 0 , P 3 , P 5 , P 8 } c , {P 0 , P 3 , P 6 , P 7 } c , {P 1 , P 2 , P 6 , P 7 } c , {P 1 , P 3 , P 5 , P 7 } c , {P 2 , P 3 , P 5 , P 6 } c ;
3) The following 15 subsets with 5 elements {P 0 , P 1 , P 6 } c , {P 0 , P 2 , P 5 } c , {P 2 , P 7 , P 8 } c , {P 3 , P 6 , P 8 } c , {P 0 , P 5 , P 7 } c , {P 1 , P 5 , P 6 } c , {P 1 , P 3 , P 8 } c , {P 2 , P 3 , P 7 } c , {P 0 , P 1 , P 5 } c , {P 0 , P 5 , P 6 } c , {P 0 , P 2 , P 7 } c , {P 1 , P 6 , P 8 } c , {P 1 , P 3 , P 6 } c , {P 2 , P 5 , P 7 } c , {P 3 , P 7 , P 8 } c .
Example 4. Let E be the elliptic curve y 2 + y = x 3 defined over GF (4). This is the Hermitian curve over GF (4), it has 9 rational points and E(GF (4)) is isomorphic to Z 3 Z 3 . We take G = 4O, where O is the zero element in the group E(GF (4)). Let P ij be the rational point on E corresponding to (i, j) in Z 3 Z 3 . Let G = 4O and D = {P 10 , P 01 , ..., P 22 } be the 8 non-zero elements of E(GF (4)). It is clear that D − G and G are linear equivalent. Then the circuits of the self-dually GF (4) representable matroid defined by C Ω (D, G) = C L (D, G) are the following subsets of D. 1) The 6 subsets of 4 elements are {P 01 , P 02 , P 10 , P 20 } c , {P 01 , P 02 , P 11 , P 22 } c , {P 01 , P 02 , P 12 , P 21 } c , {P 10 , P 20 , P 11 , P 22 } c , {P 10 , P 20 , P 12 , P 21 } c , {P 12 , P 21 , P 11 , P 22 } c ;
2) The 32 subsets of 5 elements are {P 01 , P 10 , P 22 } c , {P 01 , P 11 , P 21 } c , {P 01 , P 12 , P 20 } c , {P 02 , P 10 , P 21 } c , {P 02 , P 11 , P 20 } c , {P 02 , P 12 , P 22 } c , {P 10 , P 11 , P 12 } c , {P 20 , P 21 , P 22 } c , {P 02 , P 10 , P 22 } c , {P 01 , P 20 , P 22 } c , {P 01 , P 10 , P 11 } c , {P 02 , P 11 , P 21 } c , {P 01 , P 22 , P 21 } c , {P 01 , P 11 , P 12 } c , {P 02 , P 12 , P 20 } c , {P 01 , P 21 , P 20 } c , {P 01 , P 12 , P 10 } c , {P 01 , P 10 , P 21 } c , {P 02 , P 20 , P 21 } c , {P 02 , P 10 , P 12 } c , {P 01 , P 11 , P 20 } c , {P 02 , P 22 , P 20 } c , {P 02 , P 11 , P 10 } c , {P 01 , P 12 , P 22 } c , {P 02 , P 12 , P 22 } c , {P 02 , P 11 , P 12 } c , {P 20 , P 12 , P 11 } c , {P 10 , P 22 , P 12 } c , {P 10 , P 11 , P 21 } c , {P 10 , P 21 , P 22 } c , {P 20 , P 12 , P 22 } c , {P 20 , P 21 , P 11 } c .
VII Conclusions
We have presented the ideal linear secret-sharing scheme from the AG-codes on algebraic curves, which can be thought as a natural generalization of Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme(from AG-codes on the genus 0 curve, RS codes). These ideal linear secret-sharing schemes are not threshold for positive genus curves, which offer many new examples of access structures of ideal LSSS. The general properties of LSSS from AG-codes are proved and their applications in verifiable secret-sharing and secure multi-party computation are presented. New examples of self-dually representable matroids from self-dual AG-codes have been calculated. We demonstrated that the algebraic-geometric structure of the underlying curves is an important resource for secret-sharing, multi-party computation and the theory of matroids.
Note. After this paper was completed and submitted, the author was informed by Professor R. Cramer of his paper"Algebraic geometric secret sharing schemes and secure computation over small fields", in which the idea of using algebraic-geometric codes in secret sharing and secure computation was independently developed.
